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I. INTRODUCTION
Laura,' a colleague of mine, worked as an administrative assistant at a
well-known law firm. Her job consisted of answering phones, dealing with
paperwork, greeting the clients, and helping the attorneys in various matters.
For the last few years she worked at the firm, she endured sexually charged
comments made by a consultant from a government agency who came into
the firm to aid the attorneys in certain cases. He would send Laura emails
after the workday was over, commenting on her appearance that day-
"That sweater looked really good on you," and "You looked beautiful
today." He also made more overt comments at work, such as "You have a
great body" and "I'd love to have a better look at it later." The comments
were ongoing, occurring almost daily, and they made her feel extremely
uneasy. But because the firm viewed him as important to the success of the
cases, and consequently the law firm, Laura never felt comfortable
complaining. She felt that if the firm had to choose between her and the
consultant, it would invariably pick the consultant.2
Now imagine that Laura is a Muslim woman originally from Saudi
Arabia. She has a noticeable accent and wears traditional garb, including a
birkah. Regardless, the firm takes on a client whom it knows to have a bias
against people from the Middle East, and especially people of the Islamic
faith.3 Every time the client comes into the firm, he makes derogatory
comments about Laura's religion and national origin, making sure that she
hears. He repeatedly says that "Middle Eastern people smell bad," "Saudis
are crazy camel jockeys," and "Americans have not forgotten that Saudis
take hostages to further their Muslim crusade." This time, Laura does
complain to her supervisor at the firm, and in return she is terminated. She
wants to file a discrimination and harassment suit against her employer, but
I. The name has been changed to protect the privacy of the individual.
2. Had Laura filed a suit for third party sexual harassment, she most likely would not have
prevailed. In order to have a successful claim, the plaintiff must establish that the employer knew or
should have known about the harassment. Because Laura did not complain, the employer most
likely did not have the requisite knowledge to be held liable for third party sexual harassment. See,
e.g., Magnuson v. Peak Technical Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 512-13 (E.D. Va. 1992).
3. These facts are reminiscent of a third party racial harassment case which took place in
England. See Burton v. De Vere Hotels, 1997 I.C.R. 1 (Employment App. Trib. 1996). A local
civic group invited a comedian to perform for them at a hotel. Id. at 4. The hotel manager knew the
comedian was coming and also knew the comedian was likely to make sexually explicit jokes. Id.
During the comedian's show, he made sexual comments to two black waitresses, employed by the
hotel, who were just trying to serve customers. Id. The comedian also made jokes about the sexual
abilities of black men and women and used terms such as "nigger" and "sambo." Id. The English
court found that the manager had control over the event and should have asked his assistants to keep
an eye on the comedian and withdraw the waitresses if things became unpleasant. Id. at II.
Therefore, the employer was held strictly liable for the harassing conduct of the comedian, a third
party. Id. at 13. For a more detailed discussion of this case, see Robert E. Wone, Comment, How
Free is Harassment Free? Employer Liability for Third-Party Racial Harassment, 2 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMp. L. 179, 179, 197-98 (1999).
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she is told by her attorney that there is no remedy under law for this type of
harassment.
It is easy to conceive of a customer at a coffee shop tapping a waitress's
behind as she walks past. Or a male client, once part of the good ol' boys'
club, making inappropriate comments of a sexual nature to a female
associate. This is known among the legal community as third party sexual
harassment, and employers may be held liable for it.
4
But doesn't it seem just as easy to conceive of a customer or client
making racially-charged comments to an employee? Demeaning an
employee based on color, religion or sexual orientation? Unfortunately, the
law as it stands now protects one but not the other. Employers are liable for
the sexual harassment of an employee by a third party, such as a customer,
client or vendor.5 However, if the same third party harasses an employee
based on anything other than sex, the employer is not held responsible.
Title VII 6 was enacted to eliminate all discrimination and harassment
based on sex, race, color, national origin and religion from the workplace.7
It has been utilized to advance workplace equality and to maintain the
dignity of all employees.8 The standards set forth concerning all forms of
harassment, ostensibly to further these goals, are extremely similar.9 Indeed,
the Supreme Court has advocated harmonizing these standards.'0 Because
third party harassment on the basis of race, religion and national origin is
comparable to third party sexual harassment, Title VII should be construed
so as to prohibit all third party harassment.
This article will trace federal harassment law, highlighting the
similarities between the various standards. Part II encompasses the history
of sexual harassment, which is followed by a discussion of racial, religious
and national origin harassment. After addressing the similarities between
these forms of harassment, the doctrine of third party sexual harassment is
examined through various federal cases in Part 1II. The argument section
4. See discussion infra Part III.
5. The term "third party" denotes any person who is not directly related to the workplace in that
he or she is not a supervisor or co-worker. It includes a customer, client, supplier, vendor and any
non-employee. See Robert J. Aalberts & Lorne H. Seidman, Sexual Harassment of Employees by
Non-Employees: When Does the Employer Become Liable?, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 447, 449 (1994).
6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2000).
7. See discussion infra Part II(A).
8. King v. Hillen, 21 F.3d 1572, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("The purpose of Title VII is to...
liberate the workplace from the demeaning influence of discrimination, and thereby to implement the
goals of human dignity and economic equality in employment.")
9. See discussion infra Part II.
10. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 n.l (1998); see also infra text
accompanying note 164.
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follows in Part IV, in which it is suggested that employer liability should be
extended to all third party harassment, and the standard for such liability is
proposed. Finally, in Part V, this article concludes that, along with the
extension of employer liability to all forms of third party harassment,
prevention is the best tool to eliminate harassment and discrimination in the
workplace.
II. HISTORY OF FEDERAL HARASSMENT LAW
A. Legal Basis for Sexual Harassment
Sexual harassment law owes its origin to Title VII, which was enacted
in 1964." The Title delineates unlawful employment practices, making it
illegal for employers to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.'
12
However, sexual harassment was not recognized as a cause of action
under Title VII until 1986 in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson. 3 In
Meritor, a bank employee was consistently subjected to sexual harassment
by the Vice President of the bank during her four years of employment.
14
The Court acknowledged that "when a supervisor sexually harasses a
11. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). Title VII applies
only to employers who have fifteen or more employees. Id. § 2000e(b). However, if an employee
cannot sue under Title VII, a remedy may be available under state law. For example, a California
employee can sue his or her employer for discrimination or harassment under the Fair Employment
and Housing Act (FEHA), as long as the employer has five or more employees. See CAL. Gov'T
CODE §§ 12926(d), 12940 (West 2005).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (emphasis added). Race, color, religion, sex and national origin
are known as "protected categories." Essentially, discrimination or harassment against an individual
is actionable only if the plaintiff belongs to one of the protected categories and the discrimination or
harassment is tied to that person being a member of a protected category. See discussion infra Part
II(B)(2).
The statute also makes it unlawful for an employer "to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
(2)(a)(2).
13. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Although Title VII became effective in 1965, federal courts did not
recognize a cause of action for sexual harassment until 1976. See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp.
654, 656, rev 'd and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir.
1978). Finally, almost ten years later, the doctrine of sexual harassment was officially validated in
Meritor.
14. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 59-60. The Vice President, Sidney Taylor, propositioned employee
Michelle Vinson for sex. Id. at 60. At first she refused, but she later agreed out of fear of losing her
job. Id. He continued demanding sexual favors, both during and outside of work. Id. He also
fondled her in front of other employees. Id. At one point, he even forced her to have sex against her
will. Id.
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subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor
'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex."'15 In addition, any sexual harassment
which affects the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" violates
Title VII. 16 Although Meritor was vital in verifying that sexual harassment
is a form of sex-based discrimination, it did not fully elucidate the doctrine. 7
Later cases were handed down, however, which would give lower courts
more guidance.L8
B. Sexual Harassment: The Doctrine Explained
1. The Contribution of the EEOC
The decision in Meritor was partly based on the guidelines set forth by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 19 The EEOC was
created as the agency which enforces Title VII.20 It receives, investigates,
evaluates, pursues and authorizes the private pursuit of charges of unlawful
employment practices. 2 ' The EEOC also publishes guidelines, which,
"while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do
constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance. 22
Courts have generally adopted the EEOC's definition of sexual
harassment, and use it to determine whether sexual harassment has
occurred. 23 The elements of sexual harassment recognized by the majority
of courts are: 1) the plaintiff belongs to a protected category; 2) unwelcome
15. Id. at 64.
16. Id. (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1982)).
17. The Supreme Court did not lay out the specifics of sexual harassment as far as the necessary
elements or the basis for employer liability. See id.
18. For a discussion of these cases and the sexual harassment doctrine, see infra Part lI(B).
19. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. The EEOC guidelines, set forth in 1980, asserted that harassment on
the basis of sex is a violation of Title VII. See id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1985)).
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 to -5 (2000).
21. Id. § 2000e-5(b). In order to prevail in federal court, the plaintiff must have filed a claim
with the EEOC within 180 days, or 300 days if the employee has already filed with a state or local
agency, of the incident in an effort to exhaust all administrative remedies. Id. § 200e-5(e)(l).
Otherwise, the defendant has a procedural affirmative defense. See Gantt v. Security, USA, Inc.,
356 F.3d 547, 551 (4th Cir. 2004).
22. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)).
23. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2004).
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conduct of a sexual nature; 3) based on sex; 4) affecting a term or condition
of employment; and 5) employer liability.24
2. Elements: Protected Category, Unwelcome Conduct, Based on Sex
The first element, that the plaintiff belongs to a protected category, in
this case 'sex,' is easily satisfied. The only requirement is that the plaintiff
be either a man or a woman. 25 The second element-the sexual conduct was
unwelcome 26-- is often the hardest to prove. Sexual conduct can range from
the very obvious and explicit, such as propositions or sexist comments, to
the implicitly offensive, like requests for a date or unexpected gifts.
27
However, the "gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged
sexual advances were 'unwelcome.' ' 28  A relationship may be voluntary
while still constituting "unwelcome," but the voluntary nature of the
relationship increases the difficulty of proving that the harassment was
actually unwelcome. 29 The third element is that the harassment is based on
sex-that it would not have occurred but for the sex of the employee. 0
3. Types of Harassment: Quid Pro Quo and Hostile Environment
The conduct must also meet a certain standard of harassment-it must
affect a term or condition of employment. 31 There are two types of
harassment originally set forth in the EEOC guidelines:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either
24. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (1 1th Cir. 1982); see also Swentek v.
USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating the elements required to prove a claim that
sexual harassment has created a hostile or abusive work environment).
25. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903; Sparks v. Reg'l Med. Ctr. Bd., 792 F. Supp. 735, 742 n.16 (N.D.
Ala. 1992) (citing Henson, 682 F.2d at 903).
26. Both the EEOC guidelines and the courts require the harassment to be unwelcome. 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (2004).
27. See Amy Mathews, Comment, The Sexual Harassment Revolution: Employer Liability for
Third Party Sexual Harassment, 65 UMKC L. REV. 977, 984 (1997) (citing David D. Kadue, Sexual
Harassment at Work, C742 A.LI.-A.B.A. PROGRAM MATERIAL 465, 481 (1992)).
28. Meritor Sav. Bank, FMB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)
(1985)).
29. Id. In Meritor, the Court held that even though Vinson and Taylor's relationship was
initially voluntary, the voluntary nature of the sex-related conduct was not a defense to a sexual
harassment suit. Id. The correct inquiry is whether the conduct was unwelcome. Id. The Court
pointed out that this would likely introduce problems of proof and elevate credibility issues in sexual
harassment cases. Id.
30. See McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds
by Stevens v. Dep't of Treasury, 500 U.S. 1, 7 (1991).
31. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2000); see also Meritor,
477 U.S. at 64.
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explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment.3 2
The first two situations are examples of quid pro quo harassment while
the last constitutes hostile environment harassment.33
Quid pro quo occurs when a supervisor or someone in a position of
authority uses the acceptance or rejection of sexual advances as a basis for
an employment decision.34 The classic example is the clich6 "Have sex with
me or you are fired." Because pay, promotions, bonuses and even
employment are involved, quid pro quo harassment generally results in
economic or tangible losses if the employee refuses the supervisor's
advances.
35
Hostile environment harassment, however, generally does not involve
economic or tangible losses.36 The conduct need not even affect the
employee's psychological well-being or cause the employee to suffer
injury.37  A hostile environment results when the harassing conduct
unreasonably interferes with an individual's work performance or creates an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. 38 In Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc. ,39 a manager was often insulted because of her gender by, and
endured unwanted sexual innuendos from, the president of the company.4 °
32. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2004).
33. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-67.
34. See id. at 65.
35. See, e.g., Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1315 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (noting
that quid pro quo harassment often occurs "when an employer alters an employee's job conditions as
a result of the employee's refusal to submit to sexual demands").
36. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64. The Court found the basis for hostile environment harassment in
Title VII because the congressional intent of the law was to "'strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women' in employment, which includes requiring people to work in
a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21
(1993) (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64).
37. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. The Court resolved a conflict among circuits as to whether the
employee must be psychologically injured in order to prevail on a hostile environment claim by
concluding that it is not necessary. Id. at 20-21.
38. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65; see 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)(3) (2004).
39. 510U.S. 17(1993).
40. Id. at 19. The president made statements such as, "You're a woman, what do you know,"
and "We need a man as the rental manager." Id. He also suggested to Harris, in the presence of
The Court utilized this case in order to set forth the standard to prove hostile
environment.'
First, the Court addressed the question of what type of behavior
qualifies as hostile environment harassment.42 Only conduct "sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and
create an abusive working environment" can qualify as such harassment.43
In addition, the harassment not only must be severe or pervasive enough to
create an objectively hostile environment so that a reasonable person would
find it hostile or abusive, but the victim must also subjectively perceive the
environment to be abusive. 44 Therefore, in order for the conduct to qualify
as hostile environment harassment, the behavior must be both objectively
and subjectively severe or pervasive.45
The Court also considered a test to determine whether an environment is
hostile or abusive.46 It rejected a precise test in favor of a totality of the
circumstances approach.47 In deciding whether an environment was actually
hostile or abusive, courts should look at all the circumstances, including the
"frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
other employees, that they "go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [her] raise." Id. Finally, he threw
objects on the ground and asked her and other female co-workers to pick them up. Id.
41. Seeid. at20-23.
42. See id. at 21-22.
43. Id. at 21 (reaffirming the standard introduced in Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67). The Meritor Court
was careful to advise that not all workplace conduct which affects the terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment is actionable under Title VII. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. For instance, the
"mere utterance of an... epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee" is not
sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute hostile environment harassment. Id. (quoting Rogers v.
EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), superseded by statute on other grounds, Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (amending Civil Rights Act
of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 706(a), 78 Stat. 241), as recognized in EEOC v. Shell Oil
Co., 466 U.S. 54 (1984)). The conduct must be either severe (one major incident, such as fondling
or rape) or pervasive (repeated minor incidents, such as jokes, offensive comments and
propositions). Id.
44. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. The subjective requirement is essential because if the employee did
not perceive the environment to be abusive, then the conditions of employment were not altered, a
necessary part of the Title VII claim. See id. The objective requirement is also necessary to prevent
easily offended persons from abusing the judicial system. See id.; see also Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (advising that courts should look to the context of the
behavior so that "ordinary socializing" does not become actionable). Oncale is also noteworthy for
concluding that same-sex harassment is actionable under Title VII. See id. at 82.
45. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. "So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is
perceived, as hostile or abusive," the employee has a hostile environment harassment cause of action
under Title VII. Id. (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67).
46. Id. at 23.
47. Id. The EEOC also advanced such a test:
In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the Commission
will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances, such as the
nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred.
The determination of the legality of a particular action will be made from the facts, on a
case by case basis.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (b) (2004).
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physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance ...
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance,"
and the effect on the employee's psychological well-being.48
4. Employer Liability
a. Where Supervisors Sexually Harass Employees
While the terms quid pro quo and hostile environment are useful in
establishing whether a Title VII violation has occurred, they are not
applicable in determining employer liability, which is the final element of a
sexual harassment cause of action. 49 The more pertinent inquiry is whether
there has been any tangible employment action. For instance, an employer
is strictly liable if the employee can show that he or she suffered economic
injury through a tangible employment action. ° A tangible employment
action is essentially a significant change in employment status, such as
hiring, firing, or failing to promote."'
Supervisor conduct which does not produce a tangible employment
action still results in vicarious liability; however, an affirmative defense may
be available, possibly allowing the employer to elude responsibility.5 2  In
48. Harris, 510 U.S. at23.
49. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753-54 (1998).
50. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 76 (1986); see also Ellerth, 524 U.S. at
760-61 (adopting the conclusion of every federal court of appeals that the discriminatory actions of a
supervisor resulting in a tangible employment action place strict liability on the employer).
Employer liability is based on agency principles in this situation. The supervisor is the agent
of the principle. Even though sexual harassment is held not to be within the scope of the
supervisor's employment, the employer may still be liable if the supervisor was "aided in
accomplishing the [conduct in question] by the existence of the agency relation." Id. at 757-58
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (1958)). Therefore, it follows that
employers are strictly liable for the actions of supervisors when there is a tangible employment
action because the supervisor could not make such a decision absent the agency relation. Ellerth,
524 U.S. at 761-62.
51. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761. Other forms of tangible employment actions include:
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, a decision causing a significant change in
benefits, a decrease in wage or salary, or a less distinguished title. Id.; see Crady v. Liberty Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993). But see Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt.,
Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 886 (6th Cir. 1996) (demotion without change in pay, benefits, or duties not
enough); Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 456 (7th Cir. 1994) (a bruised ego is not
enough); Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994) (reassignment to a
more inconvenient job is insufficient).
52. This holding is from both Ellerth, 54 U.S. at 765 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775, 806-07 (1998), which were decided on the same day.
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Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,53 a salesperson was subjected to
constant sexual harassment by her supervisor, but she failed to inform
anyone in authority about the harassment.5 4  The Court reasoned that
because the employer had a policy against sexual harassment and the
employee did not report the harassment, the employer should be able to
assert an affirmative defense.55
Hence, an employer is subject to vicarious liability when a supervisor
creates a hostile environment without taking tangible employment action,
but the defending employer may invoke an affirmative defense. 6 The
defense is comprised of two essential elements: (1) "that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior,"57 and (2) "that the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities
provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise."'5 8
53. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
54. Id. at 748. Ellerth's supervisor made comments about her breasts, rubbed her knee, and
threatened not to promote her because she was not "loose enough." Id. Although she did receive the
promotion, Ellerth later quit because of her supervisor's continuous behavior. Id. Despite knowing
about Burlington's policy against harassment, she never reported the harassment to anyone in
authority. Id.
55. See Ellerth, 54 U.S. at 765. This reasoning stems from the deterrence aspect of Title VII.
See id. at 764. Title VII is partly "designed to encourage the creation of antiharassment policies and
effective grievance mechanisms." Id. If an employer who had a strong policy against harassment
and an excellent reporting system in place were held strictly liable, what would be the incentive to
have such policies?
56. This holding was adopted "in order to accommodate the agency principles of vicarious
liability for harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority, as well as Title VIl's equally basic
policies of encouraging forethought by employers and saving action by objecting employees."
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764; see also supra note 50.
57. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The Court, in imposing this duty on
employers, is following the EEOC guidelines on the matter:
Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment. An employer should
take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring, such as
affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing appropriate
sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue of
harassment under Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (2004). Any of these actions would aid in proving that the employer
exercised reasonable care. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806.
58. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. The employee who has been
harassed has "a duty 'to use such means as are reasonable under the circumstances to avoid or
minimize the damages' that result from violations of the statute." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806
(quoting Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231, n.15 (1982)). Therefore, if the employer has
put a good system in place for reporting and resolving sexual harassment complaints, and the
employee fails to utilize that system, the employee should not recover damages. Id. at 806-07.
However, a victim employee's failure to report harassment does not always shield the
employer from responsibility. The employer must have a successful reporting system because the
"absence of notice to an employer does not necessarily insulate that employer from liability."
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986). For example, if, under an employer's
reporting system, only one person is designated as the person who receives complaints, and that
person happened to be the harasser, the employer could not claim the affirmative defense even
though the employee did not report the harassment. The employee would most likely not feel
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The same holding was reached in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,59 the
companion case to Ellerth.6 ° In that case, an employee was similarly
harassed, but the employee, Faragher, reported the harassment, a complaint
which fell upon deaf ears.6' Applying the new rule, the Court found that the
affirmative defense would most likely not be available to the City because it
entirely failed to disseminate its policy against sexual harassment and did
not keep track of complaints.62 In short, while the City claimed to have had
a policy against harassment and a sufficient system in place, it did not, in
reality, exercise reasonable care to prevent the supervisor's harassing
conduct.63
b. Where Co- Workers Sexually Harass Employees
Employer liability is still a necessary element when a co-worker, rather
than a supervisor, harasses an employee, but the analysis varies somewhat.
Instead of vicarious liability, employers are held to a negligence standard.
According to the EEOC guidelines and most courts, "[w]ith respect to
conduct between fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of
sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or
supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct, unless
it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action."
64
An employer may shield itself from liability for sexual harassment by
co-workers if it imposes a remedy which is "reasonably calculated to end the
harassment. ' '65  Examples of taking prompt remedial action include fully
investigating, reprimanding the harasser for inappropriate conduct, and
warning the harasser that a repeat incident will result in suspension or
comfortable complaining about the harassment to his or her harasser, so the failure to report the
harassment is actually reasonable. If the reporting system is flawed, the employer may still be liable.
For an example of this situation, see id. at 72-73.
59. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
60. Id. at 807.
61. See id. at 780-83. Faragher was a lifeguard who endured uninvited and offensive touching
and lewd remarks from her supervisors. Id. at 780. She and other female lifeguards reported the
behavior to another supervisor, who in turn ignored the complaints, commenting that "the City just
[doesn't] care." Id. at 782-83.
62. Id. at 808.
63. Id.
64. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (2004) (emphasis added).
65. See, e.g., Scarberry v. Exxonmobil Oil Corp., 328 F.3d 1255, 1259-60 (10th Cir. 2003);
Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 663 (6th Cir. 1999); Skidmore v. Precision Printing &
Packaging, Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 615 (5th Cir. 1999); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir.
1991).
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termination.66 Basically, an employer should impose sufficient penalties to
assure a workplace free from sexual harassment by persuading individual
harassers to discontinue unlawful conduct.67
C. Other Forms of Harassment-Striking Similarity
1. Racial Harassment
Title VII protects employees from discrimination not only on the basis
of sex, but also on the basis of race, color, religion, and national origin.68 In
fact, racial harassment was a problematic issue in the workplace long before
sexual harassment, and the sexual harassment doctrine was even developed
using the framework from early racial harassment cases.69 In Rogers v.
EEOC,7 ° a court first recognized a cause of action for hostile environment
racial harassment when a Hispanic woman working at an optician's office
was abused by her co-workers and her supervisors segregated the patients.7'
The court set out the theory that a discriminatory atmosphere could be an
unlawful employment practice under Title VII.72 The Supreme Court relied
66. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 881-82; Barett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir.
1984).
67. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882. The particular penalty should depend on the facts of the case,
ensuring that the remedy is proportionate to the seriousness of the offense. Id. Although "Title VII
requires more than a mere request to refrain from discriminatory conduct," it does not require
employers to fire all harassers. Id. (citing DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 805 n.5 (lst Cir.
1980)). It is important to note that employers should not impose a remedy that will in any way
adversely affect the employment of the complaining party, like requiring the employee to work in a
less desirable location or to work different hours. See id. at 881 (adhering to the standard set forth
by the EEOC).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
69. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66 (1986) (discussing hostile
environment racial harassment cases and noting that "[n]othing in Title VII suggests that a hostile
environment based on discriminatory sexual harassment should not be likewise prohibited"); see
also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 769 n.2 (1998) (setting forth cases in which
various courts "relied on racial harassment cases when analyzing early claims of discrimination
based upon a supervisor's sexual harassment").
70. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), superseded by statute on other grounds, Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (amending Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 706(a), 78 Stat. 241), as recognized in EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54
(1984).
71. See id. at 236. The employee, Josephine Chavez, claimed that because she was a Hispanic
working with seven Caucasian women, those women abused her. See id. Even though her boss
stated her work was fine, he ultimately fired her because of that "friction." Id.
72. See id. at 238. The court found that the phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment" from Title VII is "an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the
practice of creating a working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial discrimination." Id.
The court further reasoned: "One can readily envision working environments so heavily polluted
with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority
group workers, and I think [Title VII] was aimed at the eradication of such noxious practices." Id.
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on this decision when it first held that an employer could be liable for hostile
environment sexual harassment in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.
73
The elements of a hostile environment racial harassment claim are
extremely similar to those of sexual harassment claims.74 First, the
employee must belong to a protected group or class, namely race. 7' The
employee must be subject to unwelcome racial harassment, and the same
objective and subjective standards from sexual harassment cases apply.76 In
most circuits, in order to prove an unwelcome hostile environment, the
employee must have actually found the harassment offensive, and a
reasonable member of the group would have also found it offensive.77 In
addition, the harassment must have been based on race, which results in the
plaintiff employee having the burden of showing that 'but for' his race...
he would not have been the victim" of harassment. 8
Similarly, the racial harassment must have been sufficiently severe or
pervasive so that it affected a term, condition or privilege of employment by
creating a hostile environment.79 Courts are careful to mention that the
"mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive
73. 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
74. The framework for these racial harassment elements was first set forth in a sexual harassment
case. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11 th Cir. 1982). It was adopted by
courts within the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. See Jones v. Billington, 12 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 1997) (citing Brumback v. Callas Contractors, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 929, 939
(D. Md. 1995); Owens v. Fraser Pub. Sch., 1995 WL 871216, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 1995));
Skinner v. Brown, 951 F. Supp. 1307, 1321-22 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-05; see
also Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir. 1999). The Seventh and Ninth Circuits use
different elements which basically encompass these five elements, but more importantly, they use
the same elements for racial harassment that they use in sexual harassment cases. See, e.g., Fuller v.
City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995); Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264,
1271 (7th Cir. 1991).
75. See, e.g., Childress v. City of Richmond, 134 F.3d 1205, 1207 (4th Cir. 1998). In that case,
white police officers could not bring a Title VII hostile environment claim for discrimination
directed at black police officers, because the white officers were not members of the group being
harassed. See id. However, that does not denote that a white person cannot sue successfully under
Title VII. See Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 237 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding hostile environment
racial harassment by a black elected official against a white public employee because the official
"stated that 'blacks had suffered for two hundred years, and now it was the whites' turn' and
"tolerated and helped to foster an atmosphere in which whites were called 'honkeys' and were made
the subject of ridicule and harassment on account of race").
76. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
77. "Racially motivated comments or actions may appear innocent or only mildly offensive to
one who is not a member of the targeted group, but in reality be intolerably abusive or threatening
when understood from the perspective of a plaintiff who is a member of the targeted group."
McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004). But see Watkins v. Bowden
105 F.3d 1344, 1356 (1lth Cir. 1997) (upholding "reasonable person" standard rather than
"reasonable African American or woman").
78. Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 1998).
79. See, e.g., Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1081 (3d Cir. 1996).
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feelings in an employee" is not enough to give rise to a claim under Title
VII, 80 but there are many cases in which racist comments have led to
actionable hostile working environment claims.81 Sufficiently severe or
pervasive harassment can include conduct ranging from consistently
referring to black employees as "one of them" and "all of you" 82 to co-
workers hanging a noose in a workshop entrance.83
Finally, there must be some basis for employer liability. The Ellerth
and Faragher standard of supervisor liability is generally used for racial
harassment cases. 84 As long as no tangible employment action is taken, the
employer is vicariously liable for supervisor harassment, but it has an
affirmative defense if it was reasonable in preventing or correcting
harassment and the employee did not take advantage of the employer's
corrective measures.85  Similarly, with co-worker racial harassment,
employers are held to a negligence standard-they are liable only if they
80. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), superseded by statute on other grounds,
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (amending Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 706(a), 78 Stat. 241), as recognized in EEOC v.
Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54 (1984). This same caveat was later reiterated in Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
81. See e.g., Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 108-09, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1997); Aman, 85
F.3d at 1082; EEOC v. St. Michael Hosp. of Franciscan Sisters, Milwaukee, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 809,
813 (E.D. Wis. 1998); Brumback v. Callas Contractors, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 929, 939-40 (D. Md.
1995).
82. Aman, 85 F.3d at 1082. These inherently racist comments, along with the white employees
regularly insulting other black employees with "don't touch anything" and "don't steal," constituted
a hostile environment. Id. The court noted that "[w]hile Title VII does not prohibit racist thoughts,
the law does require that employers prevent such views from affecting the work environment either
by influencing employment decisions or creating a hostile work environment. This is true no matter
what form the discrimination takes--overt, subtle or otherwise." Id. at 1087. But see Brown v.
Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706 (2d Cir. 1998). The plaintiff alleged that her supervisors told her
that they "seek[] to hire and promote people who have a 'Coach look'-the examples to whom her
supervisors referred were young non-minority persons." Id. at 709. The court acknowledged that
while these "alleged comments are despicable and offensive, they fail to constitute discriminatory
behavior that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to cause a hostile environment." Id. at 713. See also
Nguyen v. Benson Toyota, Inc., No. 96-2644, 1997 WL 159521, at *3-*4 (E.D. La. Apr. 2, 1997)
(holding that a Vietnamese-American plaintiff being called a "rice-eating gook" once by a co-worker
was "exactly the kind of 'mere utterance' that should not, by itself, support an actionable claim for
hostile work environment").
83. See West v. Phila. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 749 n.l (3d Cir. 1995) (finding hostile
environment racial harassment present). But see Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 460-61 (4th Cir. 1994)
(holding that a single incident, involving the "display of a poster with a picture of a gorilla and the
motto 'I wouldn't mind being a NOBODY if I could only get A LITTLE RECOGNITION once in a
while"' was not sufficiently severe to constitute hostile environment racial harassment).
84. See discussion supra Part Il(B)(4)(a).
85. See, e.g., Hrobowski v. Worthington Steel Co., 358 F.3d 473, 475 (7th Cir. 2004) (failing to
find employer liability for supervisors calling the employee "nigger" frequently because the
employer was not on notice of the harassment). For the various circuits which apply the Ellerth/
Faragher standard of employer liability, see Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 186 n.9
(4th Cir. 2001); Jackson v. Ark. Dep't of Educ., 272 F.3d 1020, 1024 (8th Cir. 2001); Walker v.
Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 626 (5th Cir. 2000); Allen v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 165 F.3d 405, 411 (6th
Cir. 1999); Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 294 (2d Cir. 1999); Wright-
Simmons v. City of Okla. City, 155 F.3d 1264, 1270 (10th Cir. 1998).
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knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take adequate
remedial steps.1
6
2. Religious and National Origin Harassment
Perhaps just as important in the workplace today is the dramatic increase
in reported incidents of harassment based on national origin and religion
since the September 11th attacks. 87  Religion and national origin are
protected categories under Title VII, so discrimination and harassment based
on either of these are also unlawful employment practices.88 National origin
is defined as an individual's country of origin or the physical, cultural or
linguistic characteristics of a national origin group,89 while religion is
broadly defined to include "all aspects of religious observance and practice,
as well as belief."90
The basic framework for a national origin or religious hostile
environment claim is very similar to that of sexual or racial harassment.9'
The employee must be a member of any religion or from a foreign country.92
86. See Reedy v. Quebecor Printing Eagle, Inc., 333 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. 2003). An employee
endured frequent racist remarks and graffiti in the workplace. See id. at 909. However, when "his
name was written below the phrase 'kill all niggers' on the bathroom handrail," he complained to his
supervisor. Id. The supervisor's response, that he "got it off once. What do you want me to do, tear
the wall down?" and his failure to remove the graffiti until after the plaintiff quit, was "anything but
a prompt and effective remedial action." Id. at 909-10; see also Williams v. Waste Mgt. of Ill., 361
F.3d 1021, 1029 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying the negligence standard for co-worker harassment).
87. See EEOC, EEOC Provides Answers about Workplace Rights of Muslims, Arabs, South
Asians and Sikhs (May 15, 2002), http://www.eeoc.gov/press/5-15-02.html. As of May 2002, the
EEOC had already received 488 claims of such national origin discrimination, with 194 of these
charges involving harassment. Id. In addition, 497 charges of religious harassment were filed by
Muslims, while only 193 claims were filed during the same time period the prior year. Id.
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
89. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2004).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2000). The employer has a potential defense to religious
discrimination if the employer "demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on
the conduct of the employer's business." Id.
91. See Gibson v. Finish Line, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 785, 790 (W.D. Ky. 2003) (setting forth the
same five elements of sexual and racial hostile environment and applying them to religious hostile
environment).
92. As far as national origin goes, the employee could potentially be a native of the United States
and still have a national origin Title VII claim if he or she is discriminated against on the basis of
being from the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). In addition, the religion need not
be what is normally considered an organized religion, as long as the plaintiff can explain the religion
and the particular religious practices at issue. See Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 900-01
(7th Cir. 1978) (holding that a belief qualifies as religious, even when it is eccentric, as long as it is
motivated by religion). The employer is free, however, to disregard the religious claim if he thinks it
is bogus, but he would do so at the risk of a Title VII lawsuit. See McCrory v. Rapides Reg'l Med.
Ctr., 635 F. Supp. 975, 979 (W.D. La. 1986) (finding the employer not liable for discharging two
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The harassing conduct must be unwelcome-an element which is usually
met, especially when the remarks are "uninvited... intrusive, [touch] upon
the most private aspects of [the employee's] life ... delivered in an
intimidating manner... and ...unrelenting., 93  To meet the unwelcome
standard, the employee must find the conduct subjectively offensive and a
reasonable person must also find it offensive.94 In addition, the harassment
must be based on the employee's religion or national origin, rather than a
legitimate business reason.95
Once again, for a hostile work environment to arise, the harassment
must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of
employment. Being "out of the loop" of a clique based on a certain
nationality does not qualify as sufficiently severe or pervasive96 but being
called derogatory names like "brown boy," "spic," and "wetback" along
with graffiti commanding that the employee "Go Back to Mexico" created a
hostile work environment. 97 A similar standard exists with religious hostile
environment claims-constant statements to an employee by a supervisor
that the employee must become saved and spiritually whole constitute a
employees whose extramarital affairs with coworkers were disruptive, on the grounds that their
"religious belief' that they had the right to commit adultery did not warrant Title VII protection).
93. Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 976 (7th Cir. 1997). The plaintiff employee met the
unwelcome element because the remarks were offensive to her and a reasonable person would have
found the environment hostile and offensive. See id.
94. See id.; see also Gibson, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 787-88. The plaintiff employee claimed that
after her supervisor found out that she had converted to the Nation of Islam, he told others that her
religion was worse than the Ku Klux Klan and that he did not feel comfortable working with her.
See Gibson, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 788. The court rejected the employee's claim because she did not
subjectively regard her working environment as abusive, as is evidenced by her view that the
supervisor's actions were silly and immature. See id. at 791.
95. See Kosereis v. Rhode Island, 331 F.3d 207, 217 (1st Cir. 2003). A Turkish-bom Muslim
claimed that he endured a hostile work environment when his students called him "turkey," fellow
teachers teased him about his ethnic food, and his supervisors yelled at him for being tardy. Id. at
209-10, 217. The court found, however, that the frequent reprimands by his supervisor did not
create a hostile work environment because they were stimulated by his tardiness, and not by his
national origin or religion. See id. at 217; see also Merheb v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth., 267
F.3d 710, 712-13 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that "[fliring him for threatening behavior was not treating
him differently from how any other employee would have been treated.").
96. Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 84 (2d Cir. 2001). The plaintiff employee was of
English-German national origin, and she claimed that "her supervisor and several co-workers formed
'a little clique of Irish people and they would talk about being Irish a lot."' Id. The court held that
the allegations fell short of a change in the terms and conditions of employment. id.
97. Cerros v. Steel Techs., Inc., 288 F.3d 1040, 1042-45 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive by considering the totality of the circumstances and
that "unambiguously racial [epithets fall] on the 'more severe' end of the spectrum"); see also Butler
v. MBNA Tech., Inc., No. Civ. 3:02-CV-1715-H, 2003 WL 22479215, *1-*2, *5 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31,
2003) (recognizing that discriminatory comments, such as that Iranians smell bad, put dirty laundry
on their heads and take hostages, are sufficiently severe and pervasive to create a hostile work
environment).
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hostile environment, 98 but a single comment made outside an employee's
presence was not sufficiently severe or pervasive. 99
Lastly, there must be some basis for employer liability. Most courts
follow the Ellerth/Faragher standard of supervisor liability.'0 0 When co-
worker harassment is implicated, employers are held to a negligence
standard. For example, when a teacher was teased by his students and
fellow teachers about his Turkish ethnic food, the supervisor met with the
children and staff to address the problem.'01  If the employer takes
reasonable action to prevent or correct the harassment, just as in sexual and
racial harassment, he is shielded from liability.'0 2
The vital aspect of these comparisons is the striking similarity between
the doctrinal progeny of the Title VII protected categories. All seem to give
relatively the same protection to employees, with some limits, and to impose
liability on those employers who aided in or tumed a blind eye to the
harassment around them. These similarities have been used to support the
harmonization of standards in all areas of harassment, including third party
sexual harassment.
1II. THIRD PARTY SEXUAL HARASSMENT
A. The History of Third Party Sexual Harassment
Third party sexual harassment is where a person other than a supervisor
or co-worker, basically a non-employee, harasses an employee. A third
party can be a customer, client, delivery person, vendor, temporary worker,
independent contractor,'0 3 repair person, or a member of the general
98. Venters, 123 F.3d at 962-63. This case is interesting because it also presents a rare instance
of religious quid pro quo harassment. See id. at 977. The employee's supervisor implied that if she
did not pay attention when people were ministering to her and did not become saved, he would
dismiss her. See id. at 963, 977.
99. Gibson, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 791 (W.D. Ky. 2003).
100. See discussion supra Part I(B)(4)(a).
101. See Kosereis v. Rhode Island, 331 F.3d 207, 216-17 (lst Cir. 2003).
102. See, e.g., Sheikh v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 535, No. Civ. 00-1896DWFSRN, 2001 WL 1636504
(D. Minn. Oct. 18, 2001).
103. Temporary workers and independent contractors qualify as third parties, for whose harassing
conduct employers may be liable, but they are not protected against harassment themselves. So a
permanent employee is allowed relief when he or she is a victim of harassment, but the temporary
employee sitting right next to him or her is not. See Joseph M. Kelly & Adele Sinclair, Sexual
Harassment of Employees by Customers and Other Third Parties: American and British Views, 31
TEX. TECH. L. REv. 807, 833-34 (2000).
public.' °4 This type of harassment falls under hostile environment because
the harassing conduct can unreasonably interfere with an individual's work
and create an abusive working environment.' °5 In fact, "[t]he environment
in which an employee works can be rendered offensive to an equal degree by
the acts of supervisors, coworkers, or even strangers to the workplace."'
10 6
The locations at which third party sexual harassment occurs vary. It was
originally thought only to be present in the sales and service industries,
"where pleasing the customer is paramount-and where taking rudeness in
stride traditionally has been part of the job."'10 7 Some scholars divide these
industries into high and low risk levels of third party sexual harassment.'0 8
Entertainment establishments, bars, restaurants like Hooters, strip clubs and
casinos comprise the former,'09 whereas banks, retail stores, national/
family-type restaurants like Denny's, and business, medical and law offices
are "low risk" places where employees would not expect to encounter
harassment by customers or third parties."0 The important point, though, is
that third party sexual harassment has expanded to all forms of employment
and all occupations."'
Third party sexual harassment has become pervasive enough for the
EEOC to include it in its guidelines."12  They state that, in addition to
liability for the harassing conduct of its employees, "[a]n employer may also
be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with respect to sexual
harassment of employees in the workplace, where the employer (or its
104. See Aalberts & Seidman, supra note 5, at 449.
105. See, e.g., Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1071-72 (10th Cir. 1998); Magnuson v.
Peak Technical Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 511-12 (E.D. Va. 1992); Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton
Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1028-29 (D. Nev. 1992).
106. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (citing EEOC v. Sage Realty
Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 609-10 & n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)) (emphasis added).
107. David S. Warner, Note, Third-Party Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: An Examination
of Client Control, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 361, 364 (1995) (quoting Kathleen Murray, Workplace:
Fighting Sexual Harassment Goes Beyond Co-Workers, to Clients, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1993, at
H2).
108. See Kelly & Sinclair, supra note 103, at 818-23.
109. See Jerome R. Watson, Employer Liability for the Sexually Harassing Actions of Its
Customers, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 227 (Winter 1993).
110. See Kelly & Sinclair, supra note 103, at 818-823. The authors go on to advocate that
employer liability for third party sexual harassment should not extend to the "high risk" workplaces,
those which are "prone to sexual innuendos and sexual behavior from customers," because the
employees assume the risk. Id. at 823. But see Lea B. Vaughn, The Customer is Always Right...
Not! Employer Liability for Third Party Sexual Harassment, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 49-50
(2002) (rejecting the argument that employees in certain occupations should tolerate a greater degree
of harassment); Id. at 84 (equating such an argument to the rejected standpoint in the rape context,
that "she asked for it."); Thoreson v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 563 N.Y.S.2d 968, 976 (1990) (noting
that accepting a job which exploits sexuality does not waive the right to work in an environment free
from sexual harassment).
11. See Vaughn, supra note 110, at 20 (explaining that third party sexual harassment occurs
across a "wide spectrum of businesses and occupations" and that "[n]o one is immune").
112. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2004).
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agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the
conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action."
' 1 3
This is the definition of third party sexual harassment which most courts
have adopted. 1
4
B. Arguments in Favor of and Against Employer Liability for Third Party
Sexual Harassment
Some people, employers in particular, argue against employer liability
for third party sexual harassment. These employers wonder how, because
they have no control over third parties, they could possibly be held liable for
the conduct of such third parties. The answer lies in the guidelines set forth
by the EEOC and followed by courts which recognize third party sexual
harassment: the court will factor in the amount of control the employer has
over the third party when determining employer liability.' In addition,
employers complain that if they enforce their sexual harassment policies
against customers or clients, they may lose valuable business." 6  This is
certainly a risk, but it generally pales in comparison to the monetary losses
an employer may experience during a sexual harassment lawsuit.17
Furthermore, there are options for employers in which they may be able to
avoid a sexual harassment suit and avoid losing the client-they can either
politely ask the client to refrain from the conduct or put someone else on the
account."18
Proponents of liability for third party sexual harassment maintain, and
courts generally agree, that there are sufficient safeguards built into the
rule.1 9 The standards of liability are certainly manageable; for example, the
employer is not liable if it had no notice of the sexual harassment.
120
113. Id.
114. See discussion infra Part III(C). See, e.g., Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062 (10th
Cir. 1998); Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848 (1st Cir. 1998); Folkerson v.
Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 107 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1997); Crist v. Focus Homes, Inc., 122 F.3d 1107
(8th Cir. 1997).
115. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2004).
116. See Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 333, 356 (1990) (describing employers as the "almost universally
unacknowledged victim[s]" of sexual harassment).
117. See Mathews, supra note 27, at 999 ("The big financial liabilities make it worth a company's
time to create an effective sexual harassment policy ... and to comply with both the EEOC
guidelines and Title VII,")
118. See Warner, supra note 107, at 387-88.
119. See Mathews, supra note 27, at 999.
120. See, e.g., Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1074 (10th Cir. 1998); Magnuson v.
Peak Technical Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 513 (E.D. Va. 1992). The exception, of course, is if
Employers are also shielded from liability if they take adequate steps to
remedy the harassment. 12 1 Finally, a plaintiff must still prove the prima
facie case of sexual harassment, including the aspect that the harassment was
sufficiently severe or pervasive.
122
C. Landmark Cases: The Doctrine Developed
The first case to deal with third party sexual harassment had to do with
an employer requiring an employee to wear a revealing uniform. In
EEOC v. Sage Realty Corporation,124 a lobby attendant at a Manhattan
office building was required to wear a "Bicentennial uniform," essentially a
skimpy poncho with an American flag design. 12 5 Because the poncho was
open at the sides and her employer would not permit her to wear a shirt or
blouse underneath, she was subject to sexual harassment from people
walking by on the street. 126 After numerous complaints to her manager, who
took no steps to remedy the situation, she refused to wear the uniform and
was soon discharged. 1
27
In requiring her to wear the revealing uniform, the employer made her
acquiescence to sexual harassment by the public a prerequisite of
employment. 128 In order for the employer to be liable, though, the court
insisted that the plaintiff employee still prove the prima facie case of sexual
harassment. 129 The court found the employer liable because it imposed on
its employee a condition of employment (requiring her to wear the uniform)
which interfered with her ability to perform the job. 3 0
The court in Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corporation3 ' also required
the employee to prove all of the elements of hostile environment harassment,
including that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive. 132 In that
the employer had no policy against sexual harassment or had not instituted an acceptable grievance
procedure. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Lockard, 162 F.3d at 1075; Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024,
1028 (D. Nev. 1992); Magnuson, 808 F. Supp. at 513.
122. See, e.g., Powell, 841 F. Supp. at 1028; EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 607
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
123. Sage Realty, 507 F. Supp. 599.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 604.
126. See id. at 605. The lobby attendant, Margaret Hasselman, received a number of propositions
and endured lewd gestures and comments. See id. One passer-by even said, "I'll run it up the flag
pole any time you want to." Id. at 605 n. 11.
127. See id. at 605-06.
128. Seeid. at609-10.
129. See id. at 607. The court found that Hasselman did prove the prima facie case, albeit using
different elements than those which have been the standard since Meritor. See id.
130. See id. at 608, 611.
131. 841 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Nev. 1992).
132. See id. at 1028-29; see also Hallberg v. Eat'n Park, No. 94-1888, 1996 WL 182212 (W.D.
Pa. Feb. 28, 1996) (granting the employer's motion for summary judgment since the employee failed
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case, a casino blackjack dealer attempted to do her job amidst screams of
"great tits" and "great legs.' 33 When Powell complained to her supervisors,
at first she was ignored, and then she was told to "take it as a
compliment."'
13 4
Since the case was one of first impression in the district, the court
decided to look to the EEOC guidelines for assistance in determining
whether third party sexual harassment should be actionable, and if so, what
the standard should be for employer liability. 135  The court reasoned that,
"[b]ecause Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment
free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.., in the
appropriate case, an employer could be liable for the sexual harassment of
employees by nonemployees, including its customers."'136 In addition, the
court adopted the EEOC guidelines, finding that if an employer knew or
reasonably should have known about the third party harassment, it had a
duty to take immediate and appropriate corrective action, or otherwise face
liability. 137  In this case, although Hilton had a policy against sexual
harassment and a grievance procedure, the management ignored Powell's
complaints. 38 Because the policy was not enforced and the procedure was
inadequate, Hilton failed to take appropriate action to remedy the
situation.
39
Similarly, in Magnuson v. Peak Technical Services, Inc. , 40 a different
district court handed down the same holding. 14  Following repeated sexual
harassment by a supervisor at Volkswagen, where Magnuson was sent by
her employer to work for a time, she notified her supervisors. 14  A female
to show that a customer's single lewd comment rose to the level of severity necessary to prove
hostile environment).
133. Id. at 1025.
134. Id. One evening, Powell had had enough. After a customer had stared at her and made
gestures continually for ten to twenty minutes, she told him as he was leaving that "now you can
stare at someone else." Id. at 1025-26. Hilton terminated her, citing rudeness to customers as the
cause. Id. at 1025.
135. See id. at 1027 (reasoning that since the Supreme Court accepted the EEOC guidelines in
examining hostile environment claims, the Powell court should as well).
136. Id. at 1028 (citations omitted).
137. Id. at 1030.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 808 F. Supp. 500 (E.D. Va. 1992).
141. See id. at 513.
142. Id. at 505-06. The Volkswagen manager put a hand on her leg and often made lewd and
offensive comments concerning her body. Id. at 505. He went so far as to comment that she
"looked so good" that he would have to "go back into the restroom" to masturbate. Id. The court
went into a lengthy discussion concerning which entity was actually Magnuson's employer. See id.
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supervisor told her to "put up with it for the sake of Volkswagen," and tried
to explain the conduct away, saying harassment was normal in the
automotive sales business. 143 Needless to say, no corrective measures were
taken, and Magnuson was terminated for being "too cute."' 44  After
reviewing the EEOC guidelines on the subject, the court held that an
employer is liable if it, (1) knew or should have known of the harassment,
and (2) "failed to take any corrective actions to remedy the situation."'145
More specifically, the plaintiff employee must prove the employer had
"actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of a sexually hostile
working environment and took no prompt and adequate remedial action."' 146
Employer liability for third party sexual harassment is based on a
negligence standard-that the employer knew or should have known about
the harassment. To meet this element, the employer can have either actual
or constructive knowledge. 147 Actual knowledge generally occurs when the
employee notifies the employer, or its supervisors, about the harassment. 48
After the employee complains, the employer has actual knowledge which
prompts the duty to take remedial action. 49 The employer can also learn of
the harassment through constructive knowledge, which is established "by
showing the pervasiveness of the harassment."' 150
Liability is imposed on an employer when it fails to take corrective
measures within its control once it knows or has reason to know of the non-
employee's conduct.' 5 ' Imagine a couple of customers, who are friends of
at 508-10. It determined that Peak was her primary employer, so the Volkswagen supervisor was
technically a third party. Id.
143. Id. at 506. This is actually a rather typical response-employers do not want to lose their
clients, and they expect their employees to do whatever it takes to retain the client. See Warner,
supra note 107, at 387-88.
144. Magnuson, 808 F. Supp. at 506. After being notified of her termination, Magnuson
contacted a Volkswagen manager who explained her discharge by saying that she was "too cute" for
the position-the same sexual harassment would just happen at other dealerships. Id.
145. Id. at 512-13.
146. Id. at 513 (quoting Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1983)); see Warner, supra note
107, at 374, 389-90.
147. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (1 lth Cir. 1982).
148. Id. (citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
149. See, e.g., Ligenza v. Genesis Health Ventures of Mass., Inc., 995 F. Supp. 226 (D. Mass.
1998) (holding that, without knowledge, there is no duty to take corrective action); Magnuson, 808
F. Supp. at 513-14 (suggesting employer liability because, after complaints were lodged, the
employer had actual knowledge and failed to take action).
150. Henson, 682 F.2d at 905 (citing Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1199 (8th Cir. 1981)).
Pervasive harassment gives rise to an inference of knowledge. Id. In order to prove constructive
knowledge, it must be shown that the employer has some measure of control over the situation. For
example, for sales representatives, reporters, repair people and other occupations which require
traveling away from the employer's workplace, the harassment occurs outside the workplace. In
these situations, the employer has no means to witness the pervasiveness of the harassment, and so
would not have constructive knowledge. Employers are held liable, though, for harassment which
occurs outside the workplace when the employee gives notice of the third party sexual harassment.
See Mathews, supra note 27, at 991-92.
151. EEOC Decision No. 84-3 (1984).
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the restaurant owner, sexually harassing a waitress by making grabbing
gestures toward her breasts and squeezing her buttocks.152 In this situation,
the EEOC pointed out that because the harassers were friends of the
employer, the employer had some measure of control and was "in an
especially advantageous position to address the [waitress's] specific
complaints."'5 3 According to the Commission in this case, the owner had
two appropriate measures available to him: either inform the customers that
further harassment would not be tolerated or relieve the waitress of her duty
to wait on these customers in the future. 5 4 If corrective measures such as
these are taken, the employer is relieved of liability.'55
These standards were applied in Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc. 156  Rena
Lockard was continuously harassed by two rowdy male customers.' 57 After
each offensive comment or gesture, and especially after one man grabbed
her by her hair, Lockard informed her manager of the conduct and that she
did not like waiting on these men.' 58 The manager denied her request to stop
waiting on them and did nothing. 5 9 Lockard continued waiting on them
until one customer pulled her to him by her hair, grabbed her breast and put
his mouth on her breast.
160
The court, after finding that this single incident was sufficient to prove
severity for a hostile environment claim, acknowledged that "[a]n employer
who condones or tolerates the creation of such an environment should be
held liable regardless of whether the environment was created by a co-
employee or a nonemployee, since the employer ultimately controls the
conditions of the work environment."' 161  Once Lockard notified her
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. The Commission found that the restaurant owner's total failure to address the complaint
was sufficient to subject him to liability. See id. The Commission commented further on the
employer's duty, explaining that "immediate and appropriate corrective action by an employer is not
limited to action required to stop sexual harassment that is presently occurring; it includes action
addressing sexual harassment that has already occurred to ensure against its recurrence." Id. at n.4.
155. See, e.g., Hallberg v. Eat'n Park, No. 94-1888, 1996 WL 182212, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 28,
1996) (telling the customer that he would be barred from the restaurant if there were any similar
complaints in the future constituted immediate and effective action).
156. 162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998). Technically, the franchisor Pizza Hut was found not to be
an employer for Title VII purposes, so it was not liable for third party sexual harassment. But A &
M Food Service, the franchisee, was an employer and was held liable. Id. at 1069-71.
157. Id. at 1067.
158. Id.
159. Id. His response was to command her to "wait on them. You were hired to be a waitress.
You waitress." Id.
160. Id. Immediately thereafter, she quit. Id.
161. Id. at 1073-74. In response to Pizza Hut's claim that this one incident was not sufficiently
severe to constitute a hostile environment, the court deemed that the conduct of the customers was
407
manager, the employer's "obligation to respond adequately and promptly
was triggered." 162 The manager's failure to alter conditions which were in
his control, such as asking the customers to leave or having a waiter take
over at the table, placed Lockard in danger and therefore subjected the
employer to liability.
63
IV. EXTENDING THIRD PARTY SEXUAL HARASSMENT
"Although racial and sexual harassment will often take different forms,
and standards may not be entirely interchangeable, we think there is good
sense in seeking generally to harmonize the standards of what amounts to
actionable harassment." -Justice Souter' 64
There have been many comparisons between racial and sexual
harassment, and the courts have found and adopted countless parallels. 65 If
the standards are so similar in supervisor and co-worker harassment and the
Supreme Court advocates that such standards should be harmonized, then
the prohibition against third party harassment should be extended to all
forms of harassment, not just sexual harassment. This section will pose the
argument that, in order for the law and the legislative intent behind the law
to be consistent, all third party harassment must become unlawful.
A. Close Calls and Failed Adoptions
1. EEOC Proposed Amendment
In 1993, the EEOC published a set of proposed rules, basically
guidelines on harassment based on race, color, religion, gender, national
"more than a mere offensive utterance," it was "physically threatening and humiliating behavior
which unreasonably interfered with Ms. Lockard's ability to perform her duties as a waitress." Id. at
1072.
162. Id. at 1075.
163. See id. at 1074-75. The court used a negligence standard: an employer is liable if it fails to
remedy or prevent a hostile work environment of which management-level employees knew, or in
the exercise of reasonable care should have known. Id. at 1074. Even though Lockard had notified
her manager over and over again of the harassment, he still placed her in an "abusive and potentially
dangerous situation, although he clearly had both the means and the authority to avoid doing so by
directing a male waiter to serve these men, waiting on them himself, or asking them to leave the
restaurant." Id. at 1075. Because the manager had notice of the customer's harassing conduct and
failed to correct it, the employer is liable for the manager's failure. Id.
164. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 n.1 (1998). The majority was explaining
its reliance on racial harassment cases in holding that hostile environmental sexual harassment
claims are actionable under Title VII and developing the standard of severity necessary to constitute
actionable harassment. See id. at 786-87.
165. See infra notes 251, 256 and accompanying text.
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origin, age, or disability. 166 The Commission insisted that these guidelines
were necessary for two reasons. 167 First, the EEOC determined that it would
be "useful to have consistent and consolidated guidelines that set forth the
standards for determining whether conduct in the workplace constitutes
illegal harassment."' 68  Second, "because of all the recent attention on the
subject of sexual harassment, the Commission believes it important to
reiterate and emphasize that harassment on any of the bases covered by the
Federal antidiscrimination statutes is unlawful.' 69
The first portion of the proposed rules deals with the standards to be
used in determining whether there was a hostile environment based on an
individual's race, color, religion, gender or national origin. 170  Not
surprisingly, these standards are the same as those used by most courts in
determining the same question for all forms of harassment.'71 Employer
liability is then examined, and again, the EEOC sets forth the same standards
for supervisor and co-worker liability for all types of harassment.1
7 2
Proposed section 1609.2(c) is the most relevant to this discussion
because it places liability on the employer for all harassing conduct, even
that of non-employees, if the employer knew or should have known of the
harassment. 73 The EEOC bases this extension of liability on the fact that
"an employer is obligated to maintain a work environment free of
166. Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin, Age, or
Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51266-01 (proposed Oct. 1, 1993) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1609.1(a)-
1609.2(d)). Discrimination on the basis of age is prohibited by the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, while disability discrimination is outlawed by the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Because this article focuses on Title VII, these two protected categories will not be discussed further.
167. See id. at 51266-67.
168. Id. at 51267
169. Id. (emphasis added).
170. See id. at 51267-68 (describing the proposed 29 C.F.R. § 1609.1(b)-(e)). The harassing
conduct must create an "intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment," and unreasonably
interfere with an employee's work performance, or otherwise adversely affect the individual's
employment opportunities. Id. at 51267 (describing the proposed 29 C.F.R. § 1609.1(b)). In
addition, the conduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment,
and the standard is whether a reasonable person in same or similar circumstances would find the
conduct abusive. See id. (describing the proposed 29 C.F.R. § 1609.1(c)). "[C]onsideration is to be
given to the perspective of individuals of the claimant's race, color, religion, gender, [or] national
origin," because otherwise "[h]arassers could continue to harass merely because a particular
discriminatory practice was common." Id. (quoting Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir.
1991)). Finally, in determining whether there was a hostile environment, the EEOC will look at the
totality of the circumstances. See id. at 51268 (describing the proposed 29 C.F.R. § 1609.1 (e)).
171. See discussion supra Part II(B)(1)-(3), Part II(C)(I)-(2).
172. See Guidelines on Harassment, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51268 (setting forth the Ellerth/Faragher
standard for supervisor liability and a negligence standard for co-worker liability to be included in
the proposed 29 C.F.R. § 1609.2(a)-(b)).
173. Id. (describing the proposed 29 C.F.R. § 1609.2(c))
harassment.' 74  The amendment provides that "an employer may be
responsible for the acts of non-employees with respect to environmental
harassment of employees where the employer, its agents, or supervisory
employees knew or should have known of the conduct and failed to take
immediate and appropriate corrective action, as feasible."'75
Unfortunately, these proposed amendments were never enacted.
Essentially all of the theories except the one extending employer liability to
all third party harassment have already been well established in various
cases, and so the government most likely saw the codification of these
sections to be superfluous. Additionally, the EEOC guidelines prohibiting
third party harassment on the basis of national origin and finding employers
liable for such harassment in some cases were codified. 76  Possibly
Congress was not ready to acknowledge all third party harassment in 1993,
but as the incidence of such harassment increases, hopefully the Legislature
and the Judiciary will take notice and hearken back to these guidelines set
forth by the EEOC.
2. Rosenbloom: A Third Party Racial Harassment Case
Maryland Rosenbloom is an African-American male who was employed
by Senior Resource as a program coordinator at a senior center., 77 Roger
Kolb "hung out" at the senior center, and occasionally volunteered at a
different company to serve meals there. 78  One day, Kolb approached
Rosenbloom and threatened "flicking nigger, I'm going to kill you.' ' 179 After
bystanders asked Kolb to leave, Rosenbloom submitted a memo to his
supervisor in which he described the incident and requested that Kolb not be
allowed back into the center. 8 0 There were several more incidents involving
Kolb, who was repeatedly escorted off the premises and finally kept off with
a restraining order.'' Throughout this ordeal, and indeed throughout his
174. Id.
175. Id. (emphasis added). The EEOC is careful not to extend employer liability beyond that
which the employer can actually control. The proposed amendment provides important factors to
consider so that the standard for employers remains reasonable: "the extent of the employer's control
over the non-employees and the employer's legal responsibility for the conduct of such non-
employees." Id. (describing the proposed 29 C.F.R. § 1609.2(c)).
176. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8(e) (2004).
177. Rosenbloom v. Senior Res., Inc., 974 F. Supp. 738, 740 (D. Minn. 1997).
178. Id. Kolb volunteered with the Volunteers of America (VOA) to serve meals at the senior
center, but VOA was never affiliated with Senior Resource. See id. It was determined that Kolb
was neither a client nor an employee of Senior Resource, and so Rosenbloom's claim that Kolb was
an agent of Senior Resource, and hence Senior Resource was liable for his actions, failed. See id. at
742-43.
179. Id. at 740.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 740-41. A few days after the first incident, Kolb returned to the senior center, but did
not see Rosenbloom. On that occasion, another Senior Resource employee escorted Kolb off the
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employment, Rosenbloom endured racial harassment from some of the
Senior Resource clients who called him "nigger, Sambo, and zebra," and
wrote these terms on tables in the senior center.
182
Rosenbloom's supervisor at Senior Resource responded to his complaint
by issuing a memo stating that Kolb was not to be allowed into the senior
center, and if he did appear, the police should be called immediately. 83 In
addition, "Senior Resource distributed anti-racism posters and notices that
racism was not acceptable" at the senior center. 18 4 However, because he felt
that "Senior Resource ignored his complaints regarding racist comments by
clients," Rosenbloom found his employer's response inadequate.185 He sued
under a third party racial harassment theory, alleging that he had been
subjected to a racially hostile work environment. 8 6
The court struggled with the fact that there was no case law suggesting
that "an employer may be liable for acts of third parties that create a racial
hostile work environment if the employer fails to take steps to remedy the
harassment once it becomes known to the employer."' 87  In order to
determine whether such a cause of action should exist, the court looked to
comparable cases, cases which dealt with third party sexual harassment. 8
The court split the cases into two categories-cases where an employee is
placed in a situation where the third party exercises control over the
premises. Id. Four days later, Kolb returned and intentionally bumped into Rosenbloom and called
him a "lying Black Christian." Id. at 741. A restraining order was then issued against Kolb. Id.
182. Id. at 741. The comments were apparently fueled by Caucasian clients' fears that minority
clients of Senior Resource would "take over." Id.
183. Id. This memo went out a few days before the incident in which Kolb bumped into
Rosenbloom. Because Kolb was allowed to remain at the senior center for about twenty minutes,
Rosenbloom was angry that the police were not called sooner. Id.
184. Id. Apparently, Senior Resource had "historically encountered difficulty encouraging
diversity at [the senior center]. Although Senior Resource discussed the problem at staff meetings,
at least some employees felt that little was done in the form of policies or clear direction to prevent
racism from occurring" at the center. Id.
185. Id. at 742.
186. See id. at 741-44. Rosenbloom's other claims, including aiding and abetting, negligent
retention and supervision, constructive discharge, assault and battery, and defamation, failed on the
merits. See id. at 744-46.
187. Id. at 743. This was a question of first impression within the Eighth Circuit and, indeed,
within the federal courts.
188. Id. The court considered the opinion of a commentator who noted that third party sexual
harassment is a novel expansion which has come into play contrary to the Supreme Court's implied
warning "against unsubstantiated judicial extensions of employer liability not contemplated within"
Title VII. See Warner, supra note 107, at 392 n.102 (1995) (quoting Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v.
Vinton, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)). This argument is tenuous at best since Warner bases his theory on the
fact that third party sexual harassment is not explicitly addressed in Title VII. Id. If discrimination
law were limited to the literal language of Title VII, harassment in general would not even be
prohibited!
employee'89 and cases in which the employer imposes a policy or dress code
upon an employee which makes the employee susceptible to sexual
harassment.' 90 The court also acknowledged, however, that several courts
have gone beyond these two categories by suggesting that "employers have a
broad duty to protect their employees from sexual harassment, even when an
employer does not directly benefit from the harassment."' 91
In Rosenbloom, the court did not find the employer liable, partly
because there was "no evidence Senior Resource benefitted from Kolb's
disruptive behavior or from the racist slurs by its clients.' ' 192 Unfortunately,
the court did not have the benefit of looking to Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc. in
making its decision, because Lockard was decided after this decision was
handed down. In Lockard, a waitress was severely sexually harassed by
customers whom she was serving. 93 The Tenth Circuit was not troubled
that the employer did not benefit in any way from the harassment-it
asserted that the creation of a hostile environment by customers coupled
with the negligence of the employer in failing to correct the situation were
certainly sufficient to impose liability on the employer.
94
In deciding against employer liability in Rosenbloom, the court also
looked to the actions of the employer, actions the court found to be
reasonable.' 95 In his argument, Rosenbloom claimed that "by failing to keep
Kolb from returning to [the senior center], and by not instituting a policy to
deal with racial slurs, Senior Resource ratified the racist behavior."' 196 The
court disagreed, finding that Senior Resource was not only concerned about
the incidents with Kolb and attempted to take rapid measures to correct the
situation, it also "took steps to educate its clients by posting notices and
posters regarding racism.', 197 Because Rosenbloom's employer took prompt
and adequate steps to remedy the situation, it is not liable even though a
hostile work environment may have existed. 98 The court was careful to note
that "[b]y so ruling, the Court does not intend to minimize Kolb's behavior
189. See Rosenbloom, 974 F. Supp. at 743 (citing Magnuson v. Peak Technical Servs., Inc., 808 F.
Supp. 500, 507-11 (E.D. Va. 1992)).
190. Id. (citing EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp, 507 F. Supp. 599, 609-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
191. Id. (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (1 th Cir. 1982); Powell v. Las Vegas
Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Nev. 1992)); see also Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062
(10th Cir. 1998).
192. Rosenbloom, 974 F. Supp. at 744.
193. Lockard, 162 F.3d at 1067.
194. Id. at 1072-75.
195. Rosenbloom, 974 F. Supp. at 743-44.
196. Id. at 743.
197. Id. at 744. The court admits that "[a]lthough it is disappointing that Senior Resource did not
respond more rapidly to the racist slurs by its clients, there are no facts suggesting that Senior
Resource ratified or condoned the comments." Id.
198. Id. at 744 n.6.
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or the racist statements. No individual should have to tolerate the comments
and threats directed at Rosenbloom."' 99
Although the court did not find for the plaintiff in this case, it did not
discount third party racial harassment as a cause of action in all cases. 2°°
The court concluded that "[j]ust as in sexual hostile work environment cases,
there may be circumstances where an employer can be held liable for the
racial hostile work environment created by a third party."20' Indeed, in an
early third party sexual harassment case where the plaintiffs claim was
successful, the court noted that an employer should be liable only for the
sexual harassment of employees by nonemployees "in the appropriate
case."202 Rosenbloom did not signify that all third party harassment is not
actionable; instead, it stands for the proposition that a plaintiff claiming third
party harassment may someday prevail.
B. California as a Case in Point
The California legislature has recently enacted an amendment to state
law under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). 23  The
amendment imposes liability for third party sexual harassment on
employers.20 The revised statute mirrors the EEOC guidelines by stating
that, in addition to liability for supervisor and co-worker harassment,
[a]n employer may also be responsible for the acts of
nonemployees, with respect to sexual harassment of employees,
applicants, or persons providing services pursuant to a contract in
the workplace, where the employer, or its agents or supervisors,
knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take
immediate and appropriate corrective action.2 °5
The law goes on to limit employer liability by specifying that "[in]
reviewing cases involving the acts of nonemployees, the extent of the
employer's control and any other legal responsibility which the employer
199. Id.
200. Id. at 743-44.
201. Id.
202. Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1028 (D. Nev. 1992).
203. An Act to Amend Section 12940 of the Government Code, Relating to Unlawful
Employment Practices, CAL. Gov'T CODE § 129400)(1) (West 2005). This amendment to the
FEHA is referred to as Assembly Bill 76 (AB 76).
204. Id.
205. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 129400)(1) (West 2005); see 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (e).
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may have with respect to the conduct of those nonemployees shall be
considered.,
20 6
The first case to apply the amendment was Salazar v. Diversified
Paratransit, Inc.20 7  A bus driver, Raquel Salazar was repeatedly and
severely sexually harassed by a disabled passenger, Rocha, who often rode
on her bus route.2 °8 The harassment began with Rocha touching Salazar's
hair, staring at her, calling her "bonita," and grabbing her purse.20 9 Salazar
reported these problems to her supervisor, asked for a different route and
filed written reports of various incidents, none of which received any
response from her employer.210  Rocha's conduct soon escalated,
culminating in an attack in which he exposed his genitals to her, touched her
all over, and tried to put his hands under her shirt and shorts.2 11 Salazar quit
two days later and filed suit against her employer for sexual harassment.1 2
The amendment, Assembly Bill 76 (AB 76), was "adopted swiftly after this
controversy arose.,
213
The question which surfaced in the Salazar case after the amendment
was enacted was whether the amendment was just a clarification of existing
law, so as to apply to the case, or a new aspect of the law which could not
then be applied retroactively. 214 The court held that the amendment was
"nothing more than a clarification of section 12940 ... [and] it applies to
this case. 21 5 It is interesting to note how the court asserted that "AB 76
clarified the statute to expressly hold an employer liable for [any]
harassment by a nonemployee," not solely for sexual harassment by a
nonemployee.2 1 6
However, this ruling was later overturned by Carter v. California
Department of Veterans Affairs,1 7 which not only held that the amendment
does not apply retroactively, but also clarified that the amendment applies
only to sexual harassment by nonemployees.21 8 In Carter, a nurse who
worked at a veterans' residence facility alleged hostile environment sexual
206. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 129400)(1) (West 2005).
207. 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 630 (Ct. App. 2004).
208. See id. at 632-34.
209. Id. at 633.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 633-34.
212. See id. at 634.
213. Id. at 636.
214. See id. at 635. The amendment could be construed as simply clarification, since the
previously existing statute made it unlawful for an employer "or any other person" to harass an
employee. Id. (quoting CAL. GOv. CODE § 129400)(1) (West 2003)).
215. Id. at 637.
216. Id. at 636. This could be indicative of an initial belief by the court that the amendment
outlawed all forms of third party harassment, not just third party sexual harassment.
217. 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 674 (Ct. App. 2004)
218. See id. at 692. In fact, almost every time the court mentions the amendment, it emphasizes
the word "sexual" in "sexual harassment." Id. at 677, 680, 687, 689, 690.
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harassment created by one of the patient-residents of the facility.2 ' 9  The
veteran, Brown, told Helga Carter that he wanted to sleep with her, and that
if she didn't sleep with him he would tell everyone that he had slept with her
to ruin her reputation.2 ° When she still refused, he left derogatory sexual
messages on her answering machine.221  The jury originally found that
Carter was "subjected to hostile environment harassment, the employer
knew or should have known of the harassment, and the employer failed to
take immediate and appropriate steps to correct the situation.' 222
On appeal, the Carter court discussed whether FEHA, before the
amendment was adopted, imposes employer liability for client or customer
harassment. 3 Both the plaintiff, Carter, and the defendant employer found
different sources within the FEHA to support their respective views.224
Carter looked to the preamble of FEHA, which states that the policy of
California is "'to prohibit harassment and discrimination in employment on
the basis of any protected classification.'' 225 The legislature also explained
that employers are required to establish affirmative programs "'so that their
worksites will be maintained free from prohibited harassment by their
agents, administrators, and supervisors as well as by their nonsupervisors
and clientele.', 226 The employer, on the other hand, looked to the literal
language of the former section 12940(j)(1), which only imposed liability on
employers for harassment by supervisors and nonsupervisory employees.227
219. See id. at 676. At first, Helga Carter viewed the veteran's remarks such as "You've got nice
breasts" and "You've got a nice ass" as inappropriate but harmless comments. Id. at 677-78.
220. Id. at 678.
221. See id. Brown also chased her in the hall with his scooter and tried to ram her with it. See id.
At some point, Carter reported this conduct to her supervisor who then asked Brown to leave her
alone. See id. Although the Veterans' Home had a code of conduct for the residents which
prohibited sexual harassment, the violation of which could lead to eviction, the supervisors did
nothing but issue Caner a walkie-talkie to call for security if Brown harassed her. They also sent
Brown to speak to a counselor. See id. at 678-79.
222. Id. at 680. The jury awarded Helga Carter $184,000 in damages. Ryan Daugherty, Jury
Awards Woman $184,000, DAILY PRESS, Oct. 5, 2001, http://www.vvdailypress.com/2001-
2003/100229529295650.html.
223. See Carter, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 680-92.
224. See id. at 681-82.
225. Id. (quoting Fair Employment and Housing Act, ch. 1754, § 1, 1984 Cal. Stat. 6403-04). The
protected categories of California are more expansive than those of federal law. They include not
only race, religion, color, national origin, sex, age and disability, but also ancestry, marital status,
sexual orientation and gender identity. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 129400)(1) (West 2005).
226. Carter, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 682 (quoting Fair Employment and Housing Act, ch. 1754, § 1,
1984 Cal. Stat. 6403-04). The court agreed with the plaintiff's assertion that "an uncodified
preamble is fully part of the statutory law of this state; it is simply uncodified." Id.
227. See id.
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After a detailed dissection of the language in the old statute and an
acknowledgment that the California legislature once rejected a proposed
amendment which would have made an employer liable for any acts of
harassment by customers and clients,228 the court concluded that the former
FEHA section did not impose liability on employers for third party
harassment. 229 Because of that conclusion and the fact that the legislature
chose to limit third party liability solely to sexual harassment in the recent
amendment, the court found that AB 76 did not clarify the existing law, but
rather changed the law.230  Therefore, the law should not be applied
retroactively to Carter's case, resulting in the failure of her sexual
harassment case.23'
California law states that it is unlawful for an employer to harass an
employee "because of race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry,
physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, marital status, sex,
age, or sexual orientation., 232 The legislature made it clear that its main goal
in enacting FEHA was to "prohibit harassment ... in employment on the
basis of any protected classification.'2 33  Yet, as the law stands now,
harassment on the basis of race, religious creed, color, national origin and
ancestry, marital status and sexual orientation, is not prohibited if the
harassing conduct comes from a nonemployee. Although the law claims that
an employer "shall take all reasonable steps to prevent harassment from
occurring... " it does not impose liability upon an employer who fails to
take action to prevent third parties from harassing employees belonging to a
protected category other than sex.234  There is something wrong here-a
gaping chasm between the law and the purpose behind that law.
228. See id. at 685-86. In 1984, the legislature rejected a proposed amendment which stated that
"'[h]arassment of an employee or applicant by any person other than an agent or supervisor shall be
unlawful if the entity, or its agents or supervisors, knows or should have known of this conduct and
fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action."' Id. Before the amendment was adopted,
the legislature replaced "any person" with "an employee," which demonstrates that it had an
opportunity to expand harassment law but chose not to do so. Id. at 685-86. Finally, the court in
Carter reasons that because the legislature rejected the amendment, "the final statute as enacted
should not be construed to include the omitted provision." Id. at 686.
229. See id. at 683-86.
230. See id. at 688. The court also looked to other factors, including differences in the language
of the existing statute and the amendment. The existing statute imposed liability for all forms of
harassment on labor organizations, employment agencies and apprenticeship programs as well as
employers, whereas the amendment restricts liability for third party harassment to employers and
imposes liability only for sexual harassment. See id. at 689 (discussing AB 76 as it was initially
proposed, prohibiting all harassment of employees by any person). Therefore, the amendment "is
not merely declaratory of existing law, but has effected a substantial change in the law." Id. at 689-
90.
231. Seeid.at692.
232. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 129400)(1) (West 2005).
233. See Carter, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 682.
234. § 129400)(1).
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C. Promoting Consistency Between the Law and the Spirit of the Law
The same problems that plague California's harassment law exist with
regard to federal law. Title VII was enacted in order to reach certain goals:
the Legislature wanted to work toward workplace equality and workplaces
free from all discrimination.235 Title VII "affords employees the right to
work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult. 236 But if employees are being harassed on the basis of race, religion,
sex or national origin, even if the harassment stems from a third party, their
workplaces are not free from such intimidation, ridicule, and insult.
Therefore, in order to come closer to attaining these aspirations, either the
Legislature should extend Title VII to include all third party harassment or
the federal courts should interpret Title VII as prohibiting such harassment.
Some commentators may contend that employees do not need protection
from all third party harassment. They claim that sexual harassment is
different-it is more pervasive, more insidious than any other form of
harassment.237 Because of the inherent nature of sexual harassment, that it is
the natural manner in which men and women interact, employees need more
protection from it than other forms of harassment.23 8 In addition, they claim
that extra protection is needed because sexual harassment is more subtle and
often tolerated: an employer is much more likely to ask a customer to leave
who has called the employee a racial epithet than one who made sexual
comments to the employee.2 3
9
235. "[T]he very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a
work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin
offends Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22
(1993). The Court was concerned not only with tangible effects of a hostile work environment, such
as the environment affecting employees' psychological well-being, detracting from their job
performance and discouraging them from staying at the job, but also with the theoretical effects that
abusive work environments would have on Title VII. See id.
236. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
237. See Warner, supra note 107, at 361-62.
238. See Charles R. Calleros, Title VII and Free Speech: The First Amendment is Not Hostile to a
Content-Neutral Hostile-Environment Theory, 1996 UTAH L. REv. 227, 237 n.49 (supporting the
position that "sexual harassment pose[s] a sufficient threat to the workplace that it warrant[s]
separate, expedited treatment."). But see L. Camille Hebert, Sexual Harassment is Gender
Harassment, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 565, 567-68 (1995) (exploring the uniqueness of sexual harassment
yet determining that it should not be treated differently). See generally Martin J. Katz,
Reconsidering Attraction in Sexual Harassment, 79 IND. L.J. 101 (2004) (providing insight into how
sexual orientation may affect the natural manner in which men and women interact).
239. Matthew C. Hesse & Lester J. Hubble, Note, The Dehumanizing Puzzle of Sexual
Harassment: A Survey of the Law Concerning Harassment of Women in the Workplace, 24
WASHBURN L.J. 574, 575 (1985) (Program Director of Working Women's Institute calls sexual
harassment the most subtle, all-too-readily tolerated, accepted, and ignored form of misbehavior
faced by women in the work force).
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However, if this rationale were adopted, then why should harassment on
the basis of race, religion, and national origin by supervisors and co-workers
be prohibited at all under Title VII? Why not have "sex" as the only
protected category? The EEOC commented on the singling out of sexual
harassment, stating that it "continues to be addressed in separate guidelines
because it raises issues about human interaction that are to some extent
unique in comparison to other harassment and, thus, may warrant separate
emphasis. '240 Separate emphasis, yes, but that certainly does not mean that
the other forms of harassment should not be prohibited.
In addition, opponents of extending employer liability for third party
harassment would most likely point out that, in California, the legislature did
not want third party liability to extend to forms of harassment other than
sexual. 24 ' And in the federal courts, a third party harassment suit involving
other types of harassment has never been successful.242 However, courts
have repeatedly advocated that Title VII should be interpreted broadly. 243
When deciding whether to extend sexual harassment to include same-sex
harassment, the Supreme Court noted that "male-on-male sexual harassment
in the workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was
concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibitions often
go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils .... 44
The Court went on to say that we must look to the actual language of the
laws rather than the concerns of the legislators, and because Title VII
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex, same-sex harassment is
unlawful. 4 5
The Fifth Circuit also noted:
[The language of Title VII] evinces a Congressional intention to
define discrimination in the broadest possible terms. Congress
chose neither to enumerate specific discriminatory practices, nor to
elucidate in extenso the parameter of such nefarious activities.
240. Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin, Age, or
Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51266-01, 51267 (proposed Oct. 1, 1993) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. §§
1609.1 (a)-I 609.2(d)).
241. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
242. The only federal case to date involving third party harassment not based on a sexual hostile
work environment theory resulted in a failed claim for the plaintiff. See Rosenbloom v. Senior Res.,
Inc., 974 F. Supp. 738 (D. Minn. 1997). However, the court in that case acknowledged that a third
party racial harassment claim could be actionable under the right circumstances, such as the failure
of the employer to quickly remedy the situation. See id. at 743-44.
243. See, e.g., infra note 246 and accompanying text.
244. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
245. See id. Same-sex harassment is prohibited because it meets the statutory requirement-
unwelcome harassment on the basis of sex which alters the terms and conditions of employment.
See id. It makes no difference that a man sexually harasses another man, it is still harassment based
on that person's sex. See id.
418
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Rather, it pursued the path of wisdom by being unconstrictive,
knowing that constant change is the order of our day .... 246
Because "[o]ne can readily envision working environments so heavily
polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and
psychological stability of . . .workers," Title VII "should be accorded a
liberal interpretation in order to effectuate the purpose of Congress to
eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness, and humiliation of ethnic
discrimination.' 247 Harassment by a third party on the basis of race, religion
and national origin can easily cause such a hostile work environment: it is a
"comparable evil" to third party sexual harassment.248 Employees should be
protected unconditionally from all such noxious conduct.
Extension of employer liability for all third party harassment would fit
in with both the language of Title VII and the legislative aspirations for the
law because it would go toward eliminating all discrimination from the
workplace. In order to harmonize the standards of harassment law, courts
should treat all third party harassment exactly the same as they treat third
party sexual harassment. This model falls in line with the many court
decisions which imposed the same standards for all types of harassment.249
Employers may complain that extending their liability to include all
third party harassment imposes too harsh a burden on them. But with a
negligence standard in place, this argument would not hold up.250 An
employer should only be liable for third party harassment when it knows or
should have known of the harassment and has the requisite amount of
control over the third party in order to effectuate a change, then fails to take
appropriate corrective actions.251 In my opinion, and according to Title VII,
246. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), superseded by statute on other grounds,
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (amending Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 706(a), 78 Stat. 241), as recognized in EEOC v.
Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54 (1984).
247. Id. The Fifth Circuit believes that the principles underlying Title VII should be "elucidated
and explicated by experience, time, and expertise." Id.
248. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
249. See discussion supra Part II(C).
250. See Audrey C. Tan, Employer Liability for Racist Hate Speech by Third-Parties: Comparison
of Approaches in Great Britain and the United States, 20 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 873, 905
(1998). Employer complaints would make more sense if courts were to impose a strict liability
standard as they do in Great Britain, but a negligence standard is much more reasonable and
manageable. See id.
251. This is the same standard which courts use to decide third party sexual harassment claims.
See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (e) (2004); Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (10th
Cir. 1998); Magnuson v. Peak Technical Servs., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 500, 512-13 (E.D. Va. 1992);
Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1030 (D. Nev. 1992); see also Wone, supra
note 3, at 203 (advocating employer liability for third party racial harassment and urging the courts
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employers have a legal and moral duty to eliminate harassment when it is in
their power to do so, and that is exactly what this law would mandate.
V. CONCLUSION
In order to truly further the policy goals of Title VII in eliminating all
harassment and discrimination, courts should interpret the law so as to place
liability on employers for all third party harassment. As a California judge
pointed out before the FEHA amendment was adopted to extend employer
liability to third party sexual harassment, it "makes no sense to have a
comprehensive scheme protecting employees in the workplace from
discrimination, with a huge gap leaving employees unprotected when the
harasser is a nonemployee. '252  Similarly, it makes no sense to protect
employees from sexual harassment by third parties while leaving them
vulnerable to all other forms of harassment by nonemployees.
It is true that the focus of Title VII law for the past twenty years has
been sexual harassment.2 53 But it was a necessary focus, instituted in order
to fight the pervasiveness of sexual harassment 5 4 and to ensure that men and
women were equal in the workplace. 5  When creating sexual harassment
doctrine, the courts looked to racial harassment and attempted to find
parallels.256 The Eleventh Circuit sought to compare sexual inequality to
racial inequality in Henson v. City of Dundee, stating that:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment
for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual
equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality.
Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual
abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make
in such cases to see if the employers have acted reasonably, observe how the policy and procedures
were followed, and assess the effectiveness of the employer's remedial actions).
252. Salazar v. Diversified Paratransit, Inc., 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 475, 504 (Ct. App. 2002), rev'd, 11
Cal. Rptr. 3d 630 (Ct. App. 2004) (applying the new FEHA amendment).
253. See Helen Lafferty, Is Sexual Harassment Sexual Discrimination? Still an Open Question, 7
BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 21,22 (1999).
254. See Warner, supra note 107, at 361-62 (laying out results of various surveys on the incidence
of sexual harassment); see also Deborah Zalesne, Sexual Harassment Law: Has It Gone Too Far, Or
Has the Media?, 8 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 351, 352 (1999) ("[R]ecent events, both in the
courts and outside, have brought the term 'sexual harassment' into our vernacular and people are
more conscious than ever about their interactions with others in the workplace.").
255. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
256. One commentator has noted that:
While it seems inevitable that racial and sexual harassment law develop at different
paces, the courts should not want the doctrines to diverge significantly. It is ironic that
racial harassment law, the first context in which hostile work environment claims were
accepted, must look to its sexual harassment cousin for guidance on third-party
harassment questions.
Wone, supra note 3, at 197.
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a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of
racial epithets. 7
Then, surely, the harshest of racial epithets espoused by a customer or
client can be as demeaning and disconcerting as sexual harassment by a
customer or client. As the Fifth Circuit foretold in Rogers while arguing for
a broad interpretation of Title VII, "the seemingly reasonable practices of
the present can easily become the injustices of the morrow., 258 Tomorrow is
here, and we cannot allow the injustices of harassment on the basis of race,
religion and national origin by third parties to continue.
Jamie C. Chanin259
257. 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11 th Cir. 1982).
258. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), superseded by statute on other grounds,
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (amending Civil
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